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The work gives a global overview of the information technology’s industrial civil stan-
dards, which are widely used and admired internationally, such as the ISO 27001:2005, 
which is the new international standard of Information Security Management System, 
and the ISO 17799 about the practical rules of controlling information safety, BS 7799 
about Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC), Common Criteria 
for IT Security Evaluation (CC), etc. The presentation also deals with the possibility of 
applying civil standards in the Hungarian Defence Forces and applying the standards 
during the actual ongoing development procedures. 
A cikk átfogó áttekintést nyújt az informácios rendszerek biztonsági kérdéseiről és a 
különböző szabványokról. (ISO 27001:2005, ISO 17799, BS 7799 stb.) 
1. Foreword 
In the eighties it was thought that the very intensive advancement of 
electronics and computer technology involves the absolute primate of 
the IT based live. I mean that when the Internet became popular and 
reachable for everybody not only the governmental organisations, the 
scientists thought that in the nineties everybody will do the shopping via 
the Internet, the paper based mailing, procedures and data storing will 
be done only on computers. Now in the twenty-first century we now 
that is was just a dream. But why? 
The intensive enhancement of the technology, possibilities and pur-
chasing power did not involved the application development at the same 
rapid pace. By the way the security of the network-based activities did 
not reached the reassuring level. The enhancement and legal usability of 
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public key cryptography and strong secret key algorithms gave the pos-
sibility to the computer users for secure communications, but it is still 
not enough. The security of a computer hardware element, computer 
system or network depends on the full picture, by the way the weakest 
part’s security determines the security level of the overall system. 
The aim is to make the security of the IT elements, systems and net-
works to the same level in every aspects. This ‘making’ can be evalua-
tions of the existing systems or designing new ones. The assessment of 
the security level without standards is possible, but not trustworthy. The 
IT security standards give a universal framework to our work, making 
the assessment easier and giving the possibility of using the results 
elsewhere, for example as a part of a quality management audit. 
This work introduces the most important and widely used IT security 
standards and the possibilities of using them at the Hungarian Defence 
Forces. 
2. TCSEC 
The Trusted Computer Systems Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) was the 
first notable standard in the field of IT security. It was written by the 
Department of Defense of the United States of America in 1983. It was 
revised in 1985. The TCSEC cares with the assessment of the level of 
computer systems’ security. The data on the assayed systems are the 
subject of state- or service secrets, or in other words classified informa-
tion. The TCSEC, which was called Orange Book because of the colour 
of its front cover, was a real military IT security standard which was 
written in the coldest times in the Cold War. The TCSEC was made 
mainly for the U. S. Government and the armed forces. For the practical 
use of TCSEC the different services made their regulations to join the 
requirements to the concrete situations. The Army Regulation 380-19 
can be an example for regulation of services. 
The TCSEC punctuated the significance of the security policies, 
which has to be well-defined and enforced by the system. The policy 
can be mandatory with full access control or discretionary. The ac-
countability must be also assured in the system. It means that all the 
activities made in the system have to be bound to a user (called identifi-
cation), the user’s authorization to resources has to be verified (authen-
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tication), the logs have to protected and the authorized personnel can 
easily access and process them (auditing). These requirements certainty 
are made by assurance mechanisms. The mechanisms can be opera-
tional, like the system architecture, integrity, the trusted facility man-
agement and trusted recovery. These can be life-cycle assurances like 
the security testing, design specification and verification, configuration 
management and the trusted distribution. All of the above mentioned 
has to be continuously protected against unauthorised changes. In every 
classes described later different set of documentations are required such 
as the test documentation and design documentation, the trusted facility 
manual and the security features user's guide. 
The categorisation of the security levels in the TCSEC is divided to 
four divisions and several classes in the divisions. These categories are 
the following: [1] 
D — Minimal Protection 
 Reserved for those systems that have been evaluated but that fail 
to meet the requirements for a higher division.  
C — Discretionary Protection 
 C1 — Discretionary Security Protection  
Separation of users and data  
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) capable of enforcing ac-
cess limitations on an individual basis  
 C2 — Controlled Access Protection  
More finely grained DAC  
Individual accountability through login procedures  
Audit trails 
Resource isolation  
B — Mandatory Protection 
 B1 — Labeled Security Protection  
Informal statement of the security policy model  
Data sensitivity labels  
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) over select subjects and objects  
Label exportation capabilities  
All discovered flaws must be removed or otherwise mitigated  
 B2 — Structured Protection  
Security policy model clearly defined and formally documented 
DAC and MAC enforcement extended to all subjects and objects  
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Covert storage channels are analyzed for occurrence and band-
width 
Carefully structured into protection-critical and non-protection-
critical elements  
Design and implementation enable more comprehensive testing 
and review  
Authentication mechanisms are strengthened  
Trusted facility management is provided with administrator 
and operator segregation  
Strict configuration management controls are imposed  
 B3 — Security Domains  
Satisfies reference monitor requirements  
Structured to exclude code not essential to security policy en-
forcement  
Significant system engineering directed toward minimizing 
complexity  
A security administrator is supported  
Audit security-relevant events  
Automated imminent intrusion detection, notification, and response  
Trusted system recovery procedures  
Covert timing channels are analyzed for occurrence and bandwidth  
An example of such a system is the XTS-300, a precursor to 
the XTS-400  
A — Verified Protection 
 A1 — Verified Design  
Functionally identical to B3  
Formal design and verification techniques including a formal 
top-level specification  
Formal management and distribution procedures  
An example of such a system is SCOMP, a precursor to the 
XTS-400 
 Beyond A1 
System Architecture demonstrates that the requirements of self-
protection and completeness for reference monitors have been 
implemented in the Trusted Computing Base (TCB). 
Security Testing automatically generates test-case from the formal 
top-level specification or formal lower-level specifications. 
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Formal Specification and Verification is where the TCB is 
verified down to the source code level, using formal verifi-
cation methods where feasible.  
Trusted Design Environment is where the TCB is designed in a 
trusted facility with only trusted (cleared) personnel. 
3. ITSEC 
As the European equivalent of TCSEC, Great-Britain, France, the Neth-
erlands and Germany made the Information Technology Security 
Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC). The ITSEC version 1.2 was experimen-
tally published in 1991 for the European Communities. The ITSEC is 
quite similar to the TCSEC in its principles and requirements, but the 
ITSEC defines specific requirements for IT system types. 
The ITSEC defines seven evaluation levels in respect of the confi-
dence in the correctness of a Target of Evaluation (TOE). E0 designates 
the lowest level and E6 the highest.  
The seven evaluation levels can be characterised as follows: [2] 
Level E0 
This level represents inadequate assurance. 
Level E1 
At this level there shall be a security target and an informal de-
scription of the architectural design of the TOE. Functional testing 
shall indicate that the TOE satisfies its security target. 
Level E2 
In addition to the requirements for level E1, there shall be an in-
formal description of the detailed design. Evidence of functional 
testing shall be evaluated. There shall be a configuration control 
system and an approved distribution procedure. 
Level E3 
In addition to the requirements for level E2, the source code 
and/or hardware drawings corresponding to the security mecha-
nisms shall be evaluated. Evidence of testing of those mechanisms 
shall be evaluated. 
Level E4 
In addition to the requirements for level E3, there shall be an un-
derlying formal model of security policy supporting the security 
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target. The security enforcing functions, the architectural design 
and the detailed design shall be specified in a semiformal style. 
Level E5 
In addition to the requirements for level E4, there shall be a close 
correspondence between the detailed design and the source code 
and/or hardware drawings. 
Level E6 
In addition to the requirements for level E5, the security enforcing 
functions and the architectural design shall be specified in a for-
mal style, consistent with the specified underlying formal model 
of security policy. 
There are ten Example Functionality Classes in the ITSEC. These are 
made to give system specific requirements. Example Functionality 
Classes F-C1, F-C2, F-B1, F-B2, F-B3 have been derived from the 
functionality requirements of the TCSEC classes.  
Example Functionality Class F-IN is for TOEs with high integrity 
requirements for data and programs. It can be used for example in data-
base systems. 
Example Functionality Class F-AV has high availability require-
ments, it is recommended for industrial controllers. 
In Example Functionality Class F-DI the highest priority is the data 
integrity during data exchange. 
Example Functionality Class F-DC is for TOEs which has to give 
maximal confidentiality during the data exchange, for example these 
can be cryptographic systems. 
Example Functionality Class F-DX is meant for networks with high 
demands on the confidentiality and integrity of the information to be 
exchanged. For example, this can be the case when sensitive informa-
tion has to be exchanged via insecure networks. 
4. Common Criteria 
Aimed to make an international standard, the European Communities, 
the United States and Canada made the Common Criteria for Informa-
tion Technology Security Evaluation, shortly called Common Criteria 
(CC). Its version 2.0 became an international standard ISO/IEC 15408 
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„Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation, 
version 2.0”. In Hungary the Inter-Departmental Committee of Infor-
matics (ITB) issued the CC 2.0 as the recommendation no. 16. 
The Common Criteria has eleven functionality classes in which are 
the functional requirements detailed. These are the following: [3] 
Class FAU: Security audit 
Class FCO: Communication 
Class FCS: Cryptographic support 
Class FDP: User data protection 
Class FIA: Identification and authentication 
Class FMT: Security management 
Class FPR: Privacy 
Class FPT: Protection of the TSF 
Class FRU: Resource utilisation 
Class FTA: TOE access 
Class FTP: Trusted path/channels 
There are several families in each class and several components in each 
families which are indicated like FAU_ARP.1. All the components are 
expressions about the requirement. 
The assurance classes are: [4] 
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation  
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation 
Class ACM: Configuration management 
Class ADO: Delivery and operation 
Class ADV: Development 
Class AGD: Guidance documents 
Class ALC: Life cycle support 
Class ATE: Tests 
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment 
Class AMA: Maintenance of assurance 
The level of security is determined by the Evaluation Assurance Levels 
(EALs) like the Ex levels in the ITSEC. These are: [4] 
EAL1 — functionally tested 
EAL2 — structurally tested 
EAL3 — methodically tested and checked 
EAL4 — methodically designed, tested, and reviewed 
EAL5 — semiformally designed and tested 
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EAL6 — semiformally verified design and tested 
EAL7 — formally verified design and tested 
5. ITIL 
The IT Infrastructure Library (ITIL) was developed by the Central 
Computing and Telecommunications Agency (CCTA) for supporting 
high quality cost effective IT services. By the way the ITIL is not only 
an IT security standard, but it is a best practices collection in the field of 
services. 
The ITIL was developed in the 80’s, and the actual version is v3 is-
sued in 2005, and it is constantly developed. 
The ITIL Service Management became a British Standard BS 15000 
and later an international standard ISO 20000. 
There are nine ITIL books, which are the following: 
1. Service Delivery (part of IT Service Management); 
2. Service Support (part of IT Service Management); 
3. ICT Infrastructure Management; 
4. Security Management; 
5. The Business Perspective; 
6. Application Management; 
7. Software Asset Management; 
8. Planning to Implement Service Management; 
9. ITIL Small-Scale Implementation. 
6. BS 7799-1 (ISO 17799) 
The BS 7799, where the BS stands for British Standard, was issued by 
the British Standard Institute in 1995. Now this original part is called 
Part 1. It became an international standard, called ISO/IEC 17799:2000 
„Information Technology — Code of practice for information security 
management”. Its latest version is ISO/IEC 17799:2005. 
The ISO/IEC 17799:2005 consists of the following chapters: [5] 
 Risk assessment and treatment; 
 Security policy; 
 Organization of information security; 
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 Asset management; 
 Human resources security; 
 Physical and environmental security; 
 Communications and operations management; 
 Access control; 
 Information systems acquisition, development and maintenance; 
 Information security incident management; 
 Business continuity management; 
 Compliance. 
7. BS 7799-2 (ISO 27001) 
The British Standard Institute attached a second part to BS 7799 in 
1999, it’s name is BS 7799-2 or BS 7799 Part 2 "Information Security 
Management Systems - Specification with guidance for use." The Inter-
national Organization for Standardization and the IEC adopted it to an 
international standard ISO/IEC 27001:2005. 
The standard determines the requirements for establishing, imple-
menting, operating, monitoring, reviewing, maintaining and improving 
a documented Information Security Management System (ISMS) and 
specifies requirements for the management of the implementation of 
security controls. 
The ISO/IEC 27001 aligns with quality assurance standards like ISO 
9001 or ISO 14001. It is recommended to use this standard together 
with ISO/IEC 17799:2005. 
8. COBIT 
In 1992 the Information Systems Audit and Control Association 
(ISACA), and the IT Governance Institute (ITGI) issued the Control 
Objectives for Information and related Technology (COBIT), which is a 
framework for IT management. 
The controlled processes [6] by the COBIT are the following. 
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Domain  Process 
Planning &  PO1 Define a strategic IT plan 
Organisation PO2 Define the information architecture 
 PO3 Determine technological direction 
 PO4 Define the IT organisation and relationships 
 PO5 Manage the IT investment 
 PO6 Communicate management aims and direction 
 PO7 Manage human resources 
 PO8 Ensure compliance with external requirements 
 PO9 Assess risks 
 PO10 Manage projects 
 PO11 Manage quality 
Acquisition &  AI1 Identify automated solutions 
Implementation AI2 Acquire and maintain application software 
 AI3 Acquire and maintain technology infrastructure 
 AI4 Develop and maintain procedures 
 AI5 Install and accredit systems 
 AI6 Manage changes 
Delivery & Support DS1 Define and manage service levels 
 DS2 Manage third-party services 
 DS3 Manage performance and capacity 
 DS4 Ensure continuous service 
 DS5 Ensure systems security 
 DS6 Identify and allocate costs 
 DS7 Educate and train users 
 DS8 Assist and advise customers 
 DS9 Manage the configuration 
 DS10 Manage problems and incidents 
 DS11 Manage data 
 DS12 Manage facilities 
 DS13 Manage operations 
Monitoring M1 Monitor the processes 
 M2 Assess internal control adequacy 
 M3 Obtain independent assurance 
 M4 Provide for independent audit 
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9. Applying standards in the HDF 
The Hungarian Defence Forces are going through a permanent trans-
formation from the change of the political system in 1989. [7] The next 
step was joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1998. The 
requirements are high in all fields. The IT security is not yet harmonised 
with standards, just with NATO regulations. Now the Hungarian De-
fence Forces does not use any international industrial IT security stan-
dards for the design, installation and implementation of the military 
networks, just inner regulations which are secure, but these does not 
make possible to determine their security level.  
In my opinion the possible later use of international industrial IT se-
curity standards can make the interoperability with other NATO or civil 
networks. 
From the standards detailed above the TCSEC, ITSEC and the 
Common Criteria could only be used for evaluating hardware and soft-
ware elements, but not for complex IT systems. For the complex evalua-
tion the ITIL, the ISO/IEC 17799 and the COBIT can be used. 
The ITIL is the most complicated standard. In several times the 
ISO/IEC 17799 and the COBIT got part from the ITIL, but nowadays it 
is not so popular as the others. Because of the decreasing popularity less 
documentations and materials are accessible. 
The COBIT was published in the United States by experts caring 
with financial informatics. This is why it can be used very good in the 
field of finance (for example banking informatics), but not really fits 
military requirements. 
Because of its structure, approach, and details the ISO/IEC 17799 to-
gether with the ISO/IEC 27001 are the best recommended for using as IT 
security standard for designing and implementing secure systems and net-
works for IT experts. Nowadays the ISO/IEC 17799 seems to be the most 
popular IT security standard. Since the correlations of army’s requirements 
and the pure IT security needs and the popularity of this pair of standards 
makes them recommended to use in the Hungarian Defence Forces. 
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